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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
       Filed March 8, 2002 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 01-1681 
 
JOYCE J. QUINN, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF 
DELAWARE; d/b/a/ CF MOTORFREIGHT; 
A. WILLIAM KUDRICK 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 99-cv-01865) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
 
Argued December 17, 2001 
 
Before: SLOVITER, McKEE, Circuit Judges, and 
HAYDEN,*  District Judge 
 
(Filed: March 8, 2002) 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
* Hon. Katharine S. Hayden, United States District Judge for the 
       District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
 
  
       Francine Z. Taylor (ARGUED) 
       Lancaster, PA 17602-2949 
 
        Attorney for Appellant 
 
       Vincent Candiello (ARGUED) 
       G. Scott Paterno 
       Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP 
       Harrisburg, PA 17101 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee, 
       Consolidated Freightways of 
       Delaware 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
HAYDEN, District Judge: 
 
After a five day trial on Joyce Quinn's sexual harassment 
lawsuit against her former employer, Consolidated 
Freightways Corporation (hereafter "CF"), the jury returned 
a verdict in favor of defendant in less than an hour. Quinn 
appeals from evidentiary decisions of the trial court, 
including a discovery sanction that effectively precluded 
potentially corroborating testimony of a co-worker. Because 
we find that these rulings denied plaintiff the opportunity to 
present critical evidence to the jury, we reverse. 
 
Background 
 
Joyce Quinn, with established credentials in the trucking 
industry, was hired by CF as an account manager in its 
York Terminal on May 11, 1992. Quinn claims that in the 
course of her employment at CF, the predominantly male 
sales staff and managers, and in particular William 
Kudrick, a CF executive, sexually harassed and 
discriminated against her. 
 
Quinn and Kudrick had a sexual relationship in 1990, 
before Quinn began working for CF. However, Quinn ended 
it after approximately two months. She claims that Kudrick 
had exhibited inappropriate behavior toward her as early as 
1985. That year, while she was working elsewhere, he 
charged her on a golf course, tackled her to the ground, 
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and pinned her beneath him in the presence of two clients. 
Kudrick confirmed this incident when he testified at trial in 
the instant suit. 
 
Sometime in 1993, after she was hired by CF, Quinn was 
required to work two days per week at CF's Lancaster 
terminal, which was under Kudrick's supervision. Quinn 
alleges that Kudrick repeatedly suggested that they"fool 
around." Thereafter, in 1995, Kudrick became Quinn's 
direct supervisor at CF's York terminal. Quinn was the only 
female sales manager at that facility, and she testified that 
an ongoing hostile work environment existed there, and 
that it intensified after Kudrick became her supervisor. 
 
In March, 1996 Quinn was diagnosed with a major 
depressive disorder which she attributes to workplace 
conditions. Medication was prescribed for her, and her 
psychiatrist instructed her to reduce her work schedule 
which was then 60 hours/week. 
 
During the leave of absence that followed, Quinn filed an 
initial complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission (PHRC). That complaint, as subsequently 
supplemented, on April 15, 1996, accused CF of sexual 
discrimination and illegal retaliation for Quinn engaging in 
protected behavior. Quinn took another leave of absence 
later in April following a brief return to work. In May, 
following a heated exchange over Quinn's reduced work 
schedule, Kudrick fired her. The firing was purportedly for 
insubordination. 
 
Quinn filed her federal lawsuit in October 1999 against 
CF and Kudrick, alleging various disability and 
discrimination claims against CF, including sex 
discrimination, disability discrimination and retaliation in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). Additionally, 
the complaint charged Kudrick with violating the PHRA, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and 
battery. In November 1999 the defendants filed motions to 
dismiss. After stipulation of all parties, Quinn amended her 
complaint by omitting the claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and assault and battery; and by limiting 
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the individual claims against Kudrick to charges of sexual 
discrimination. Thereafter, the judge denied the defendants' 
motions to dismiss, and the case proceeded to discovery. 
 
In July 2000, close to the conclusion of the discovery 
period, plaintiff deposed a longtime CF employee, Vida 
Trout Passion, who was working as a sales manager at the 
Reading Terminal, about one hour's drive from the 
Lancaster Terminal that plaintiff was assigned to. Passion 
testified at length about a hostile work environment at the 
Reading Terminal, and said that she had unsuccessfully 
complained about it for years. Additionally, in response to 
questioning by CF's attorney, Passion disclosed that she 
once witnessed Kudrick sexually accost Quinn in a hotel 
room that Quinn and Passion were sharing during a sales 
conference. Quinn was not present at that deposition when 
Passion offered that testimony. Earlier, in her own 
deposition, Quinn had described an encounter with 
Kudrick in a hotel room during which he purportedly made 
unwanted sexual advances towards her. However, Quinn 
testified that she had been alone in the room at the time of 
that incident. 
 
CF's pretrial motions included a motion in limine in 
which CF asked the trial court to exclude testimony Vida 
Passion might offer about her own observations at CF's 
Reading Terminal. These observations allegedly included 
gender oriented discussions including discussions about 
"strip club" escapades, and conversations that could 
arguably establish a hostile work environment under Title 
VII. CF argued that Passion's observations were not 
relevant to Quinn's Title VII claim because Passion worked 
at the Reading facility, and Quinn's allegations pertained to 
the Lancaster facility. Quinn's counsel attempted to rebut 
that argument by pointing out that Division Manager 
Robert Warner, supervised both facilities, and that 
Passion's observations about the Reading Terminal 
corroborated Quinn's allegations regarding the environment 
at the Lancaster Terminal. The District Court agreed with 
CF and entered an order precluding Passion from testifying 
about her observations at CF's Reading Terminal. 
 
After discovery closed, CF moved for summary judgment. 
Quinn filed a brief in opposition to that motion in which 
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she specified in a number of instances of Kudrick's 
inappropriate and unwanted sexual advances toward her. 
These included two such occasions in a hotel room, and 
Quinn noted that Passion had witnessed one of those 
advances. 
 
The judge nevertheless granted CF's motion for summary 
judgment as to Quinn's ADA and PHRA claims, and she 
also dismissed all of the claims against Kudrick. Quinn's 
Title VII claims against CF for sexual discrimination, hostile 
environment, and retaliation then proceeded to trial. 
 
On the afternoon of Friday, February 9, 2001, Quinn's 
attorney faxed CF's attorney a new time line of events that 
she intended to use as an exhibit during her opening 
statement. The following Monday, just before the jury was 
to be called into the courtroom to hear opening statements, 
and after the attorneys had worked out a date discrepancy 
on the time line, CF's attorney asked the judge to address 
an issue concerning exhibits. He argued that particular 
portions of the new time line exhibit raised new issues, one 
of which, an incident where Kudrick accosted plaintiff in a 
hotel room, he described as "a brand new allegation and 
what we presume will be testimony by plaintiff that has 
never been raised before regarding a second hotel incident." 
App. 17. Counsel for Quinn confirmed that her client would 
be testifying about that incident, and counsel for CF stated 
that "this is a discovery abuse," App. 18, because Quinn's 
answers to the interrogatories Kudrick propounded 
identified only one hotel room incident and Quinn had 
never amended those answers. Now the time line exhibit 
reflected two incidents. CF argued that this was a violation 
of the disclosure required by the discovery rules, and 
amounted to a "dramatic addition." He asked the court to 
impose sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 and preclude 
testimony of a second hotel incident. App. 18-19.1 
 
In response, Quinn's attorney pointed out that CF had 
known about Vida Passion's testimony regarding this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Notwithstanding, this apparent conflict, there is no indication in the 
record on appeal that CF attempted, in any of the several in limine 
applications it made before trial, to exclude either plaintiff's or 
Passion's 
testimony about the hotel room incident Passion said she had witnessed. 
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second incident since she was deposed in the presence of 
CF's counsel in July 2000. App. 26-27. She also alluded to 
the difficulties she had experienced in obtaining Vida 
Passion's deposition, and Quinn's concerns about putting 
Passion in jeopardy since Passion still worked for CF. App. 
25. Notwithstanding that explanation, the trial court 
admonished Quinn's attorney that "you cannot come in on 
the day of trial and bolster your case with new allegations 
that haven't been disclosed in discovery," App. 27. The 
court granted CF's request for sanctions and ordered: "The 
evidence will be excluded from the time line and from the 
testimony that will be presented here." App. 29. 
 
In asking the court to reconsider that ruling, Quinn's 
counsel argued that both sides had learned about Passion's 
corroborating testimony regarding Kudrick's conduct at the 
same time, back in July 2000 when Passion was deposed in 
the presence of CF's attorney. App. 32-33. However, the 
trial court was not dissuaded from its belief that CF's 
objection was appropriate, and that Quinn was improperly 
attempting to change her testimony on the eve of trial, and 
therefore the court refused to reconsider its prior ruling. 
App. 34-35. 
 
Accordingly, when Passion testified at trial, she was not 
examined about the hotel incident in which she allegedly 
saw Kudrick accost Quinn. Similarly, because the court 
had granted CF's motion in limine, Passion was not asked 
about the allegedly hostile work environment at CF's 
Reading facility. CF defended against Quinn's allegations of 
discrimination and retaliation by offering testimony that 
she had actually been discharged for misconduct and 
insubordination. The jury did not accept Quinn's claim that 
this explanation was pretextual, and returned a verdict for 
CF and against Quinn. This appeal followed. 
 
Standard of Review and Jurisdiction 
 
The trial court had jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a)(1). We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We review the 
trial court's decisions regarding the discovery sanction and 
the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. See 
Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 
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1995); Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F. 3d 188 (3d Cir. 
1994); Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 
559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977), reversed on other grounds. 
 
Discussion 
 
Trial judges are afforded wide discretion in making 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence. See Hurley v. 
Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Fuentes v. Reilly, 590 F.2d 509, 511 (3d Cir. 1979). We 
review admissibility determinations, and exclusion of 
evidence for an abuse of discretion. "[T]he exclusion of 
critical evidence is an `extreme' sanction, not normally to be 
imposed absent a showing of willful deception or`flagrant 
disregard' of a court order by the proponent of the 
evidence." Meyers, 559 F.2d at 904. In Konstantopoulos v. 
Westvaco Corp., 112 F. 3d 712 (3rd Cir. 1977), we relied on 
the factors in Meyers, 559 F.2d at 904-905, in considering 
whether a district court had abused its discretion in 
excluding testimony of an expert witness as a discovery 
sanction. Along with the importance of the excluded 
testimony, the Meyers factors include (1) the prejudice or 
surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded 
witnesses would have testified; (2) the ability of that party 
to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which waiver of the 
rule against calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the 
orderly and efficient trial of the case or other cases in the 
court; and (4) bad faith or wilfulness in failing to comply 
with the district court's order. 
 
It is undisputed that Vida Passion was a key witness for 
plaintiff -- she was a long time employee still working for 
CF at the time of trial. Passion's testimony about the hotel 
incident with Kudrick was clearly probative, highly relevant, 
and it had the potential to provide strong support for 
plaintiff's case, notwithstanding CF's ability to impeach it 
with Quinn's own recollection. 
 
Thus, on the eve of trial, plaintiff was denied testimony 
that could have corroborated her account of an unwelcome 
sexual "advance" by her supervisor at CF. Counsel for CF 
negated this crucial testimony not by impeachment, but by 
claiming that plaintiff's counsel had violated discovery 
rules. Despite the claim of a last minute surprise that he 
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made to the trial court, during oral argument on this 
appeal, CF's attorney stated that from the time Vida 
Passion gave corroborating, damaging, testimony about 
Kudrick during her deposition, he knew he had potent 
cross-examination material. Quinn had testified at her 
deposition to one hotel room incident during which she was 
alone; now Quinn was offering Passion to testify about a 
hotel room incident where she, Passion, was present-- 
conflicting with plaintiff's own version. Shortly after 
Passion's deposition, discovery closed and plaintiff never 
supplemented her interrogatory answers so as to add a 
second hotel room incident. 
 
Quinn's brief in opposition to CF's motion for summary 
judgment, filed October 25, 2000, did specify that her 
evidence included two hotel room incidents, one of them 
witnessed by Passion. CF's attorney indicated at argument 
that he did not care how many incidents were referenced 
there: he had plaintiff locked into a description of one 
highly charged incident that inherently conflicted with 
Passion's testimony. CF therefore knew of Passion's 
testimony for months before attempting to strike it as a last 
minute surprise that justified sanctions as a discovery 
abuse. Not only is it clear that counsel for CF was not 
surprised by evidence of this hotel encounter, but he 
concedes that any prejudice from admitting this testimony 
was minimal at best because it afforded him an additional 
avenue to impeach Quinn's own testimony. 
 
When we apply the Meyers factors to this record, it is 
clear that CF had known about Passion's description of the 
hotel incident for over seven months; any prejudice was 
neutralized because CF's trial counsel was confident he 
could cross-examine Quinn based upon Passion's 
testimony; there was no suggestion that the trial would be 
interrupted; and although the trial court scolded Quinn's 
attorney when she offered reasons for Quinn's not having 
supplemented her original deposition testimony, there was 
no specific finding of bad faith or wilfulness. The overtly 
malign motive CF's attorney ascribed to plaintiff-- that she 
was conforming her testimony to Passion's and deliberately 
fabricating a second incident -- was never tested by the 
trial judge. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1); 
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Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State University, 227 F.3d 133 (3d 
Cir. 2000). Most striking, there is not a shred of evidence 
that CF was surprised or that it would have been 
prejudiced by the admission of Quinn's or Passion's 
testimony on the second hotel room incident, testimony 
counsel was fully prepared to exploit on cross-examination. 
To exclude critical evidence for failing to amend 
interrogatory answers under these circumstances 
champions form over substance and denied Quinn her full 
day in court. See Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 
879 F.2d 43, 53 (3d Cir. 1989) (It is "highly probable that 
the evidentiary rulings affected the outcome of the case.").2 
 
The trial court's blanket exclusion of Passion's testimony 
regarding a hotel incident involving Kudrick and Quinn is 
not supported by this record. Plaintiffs face proof problems 
in employment discrimination cases. See United States 
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 
(1983) (acknowledging that "[a]ll courts have recognized 
that the question facing triers of fact in discrimination 
cases is both sensitive and difficult . . . [and that] [t]here 
will seldom be eyewitness testimony as to the employer's 
mental processes" which the plaintiff can use to show 
discriminatory conduct); Josey v. John H. Hollingsworth 
Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging 
that there is seldom direct "smoking gun" evidence 
of discrimination). This has prompted a "judicial 
inhospitability to blanket evidentiary exclusions in 
discrimination cases," in this and other circuits. Glass v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d at 195. In Glass, we cited to 
an Eighth Circuit decision, Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 
856 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988), where that court noted that 
"the effects of blanket evidentiary exclusions can be 
especially damaging in employment discrimination cases, in 
which plaintiffs must face the difficult task of persuading 
the fact-finder to disbelieve an employer's account of his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Regarding Quinn's other points on appeal, we do not find the trial 
court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence that CF, through 
Kudrick, decided not to contest Quinn's application for unemployment 
benefits, although the ruling may be revisited in light of the proofs that 
will be presented as a result of our decision. Finally, our decision makes 
it unnecessary to address the denial of Quinn's motion for a new trial. 
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own motives." Estes, 856 F.2d at 1103. Our decision in 
Glass took note of a subsequent Eighth Circuit case where 
the court reversed a ruling in a disparate treatment sex 
discrimination case that barred the plaintiff from 
introducing evidence of prior sexual harassment of herself 
and other employees of the defendant. Hawkins v. 
Hennepin Technical Center, 900 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1990), 
pointed out that "an atmosphere of condoned sexual 
harassment in a workplace increases the likelihood of 
retaliation for complaints in individual cases." 900 F.2d at 
156. Following this reasoning, in Glass we concluded that 
the district court abused its discretion when it barred Glass 
from eliciting testimony about how the hostile work 
environment of his employment bore on his job 
performance, 34 F. 3d at 195, and we reversed and 
remanded for a new trial. 
 
Moreover, even absent our concern with blanket 
evidentiary exclusions, we remain troubled by the trial 
judge granting the sanctions CF requested here on the 
morning of trial -- made without advance warning to 
plaintiff's attorney.3 Although she did testify for plaintiff, 
Passion's testimony was significantly limited in scope 
because of the trial court's rulings. Given the importance of 
that testimony, and CF's advance knowledge of it, we 
conclude that the trial court's order precluding Passion's 
testimony about a hotel incident was an abuse of 
discretion. For similar reasons, we must also conclude that 
the district court abused its discretion by precluding 
testimony of Passion's observations about the environment 
at CR's Reading Terminal. 
 
The exclusion of Passion's testimony about the sexually 
charged work environment at CF's Reading Terminal was a 
blanket exclusion that denied Quinn an opportunity to 
present evidence about the atmosphere maintained by CF 
at a work site where Passion -- like Quinn at the York 
Terminal -- was the only female account manager. 
Moreover, the very same individual, Division Manager 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Counsel informed us at argument that the time line exhibit was never 
introduced at trial. It reflected, according to Quinn's attorney, events 
supporting her disparate treatment claims. 
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Robert Warner, supervised both facilities. According to 
Passion's deposition testimony, her peers and supervisor at 
Reading referred to her in derogatory, gender-based terms 
and when she complained she was told that it was"just 
part of the job." App. 248. Indeed, that is exactly what 
Quinn's suit alleges; that this environment was"part of the 
job." It is also exactly what Title VII prohibits. Passion 
claimed pornographic pictures were openly displayed at the 
Reading Terminal and that the male employees hung 
postcards and "trophies" they brought back from a local 
hangout, Al's Cabaret, which featured "girlie" shows. 
Although Quinn never worked at the Reading Terminal, like 
Passion -- she had reported offensive conduct at the York 
Terminal to Division Manager Robert Warner. Passion's 
testimony about the workplace environment could establish 
an atmosphere of "condoned sexual harassment in a 
workplace [that] increases the likelihood of retaliation for 
complaints in individual cases," Hawkins, 900 F. 2d at 156, 
and amounted to critical evidence from which the jury 
could find that CF's proffered reason for plaintiff's 
termination was pretextual. 
 
Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, the 
judgment entered by the trial court will be reversed and the 
matter remanded for a new trial. 
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